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Introduction 
 
The title of this chapter may seem an odd one. For many people, punishment and 
rehabilitation are alternatives between which we must choose, rather than 
potential synonyms or alternative ways of referring to similar processes. Can 
punishment ever be rehabilitation? Don’t rehabilitation’s supporters tend to see 
offending as rooted in people’s experience of social exclusion and injustice, to 
regard the trope of individual (criminal) responsibility (on which the legitimacy 
of punishment ultimately depends) as misconceived, and to stress the duty of the 
state somehow to fix the mess that produced crime? Punishment, at least for 
some rehabilitationists, seems little more than a fancy cloak to drape around the 
otherwise nakedly vengeful instincts of those that think (absurdly, these critics 
would argue) that there is something sensible, appropriate and fair about piling 
hurt on hurt.  
 
And yet, many practitioners of rehabilitation – even those sympathetic to these 
criticisms of punishment – hold on to a belief in the capacity of people to change 
themselves and their situations; to make different choices; to overcome their 
circumstances; to author a different and better future. Even those who are 
deterministic when it came to the genesis of criminal behaviors and problems, 
somehow seem to become believers in free will or the power of human agency 
(even under intense social and structural pressures) when it come to the future 
prospects of people undergoing rehabilitation. Moreover, many rehabilitationists 
also have an acute sense of justice or injustice, reflected in their demands that 
the state honor its obligations to those whose adverse life experiences have 
proved ‘criminogenic’. 
 
Readers will already have noted a number of paradoxes and possible 
contradictions in play here, in terms of how we conceive of individual and 
political responsibility for crime and other social harms, of how we understand 
and deliver fairness and justice, and in our approaches to the righting of wrongs. 
To try to unravel some of these threads and make sense of these questions 
requires an examination of the contested and multiple meanings of these two 
terms – rehabilitation and punishment – before we can begin to understand at 
least some of the potential inter-relationships between them. 
 
Which Rehabilitation? 
 
Both as set of concepts and as a set of practices, rehabilitation is a ‘fankle’. Fankle 
is a Scots word that translates loosely as ‘tangle’. The unraveling – or at least the 
teasing apart – of the distinct threads of a fankle is a tiresome and time-
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consuming job, but a necessary one, if only so that we can knot them together 
again properly at the end. 
 
Most textbook discussions of rehabilitation begin with dictionary definitions. 
Raynor and Robinson’s (2009: 2) excellent book, for example, tells us that the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines rehabilitation as ‘the action of restoring 
something to a previous (proper) condition or status’. So, rehabilitation is (1) an 
action that (2) restores (3) for the better. Raynor and Robinson (2009: 3) also 
note that the OED’s supplementary definition refers to the ‘restoration of a 
disabled person, a criminal etc., to some degree of normal life by appropriate 
training etc.’ This version adds the concepts of some (4) ‘normal’ standard, 
returning to which requires (5) some form of third party intervention. 
 
Moving on to criminological uses of the term, Raynor and Robinson (2009) argue 
that, despite the frequency with which (offender) rehabilitation has been 
discussed in the literature (and, we might add, in policy and practice), it is rarely 
‘unpacked’ and critically examined. They provide the following example of a 
problematic criminological description of it: 
 
‘taking away the desire to offend, is the aim of reformist or rehabilitative 
punishment. The objective of reform or rehabilitation is to reintegrate the 
offender into society after a period of punishment, and to design the 
content of the punishment so as to achieve this’ (Hudson, 2003: 26).   
 
As Raynor and Robinson (2009) note, this statement raises a number of issues. 
Firstly there seem to be at least two objectives in play here: ‘taking away the 
desire to offend’ (that is, somehow changing the offender) and reintegration into 
society (that is, somehow changing his of her relationship with and status in 
society). But how are these two objectives related? Secondly, and more directly 
pertinent to this chapter, it suggest two different relationships between 
rehabilitation and punishment; in one rehabilitation comes after punishment, in 
another rehabilitation shapes (the nature of) punishment. We might easily 
imagine a third, as suggested above in the introduction, where rehabilitation is 
cast as an alternative to punishment. Finally, this description elides the 
distinction between rehabilitation and reform; as we will see below, for others 
these two ideas are distinct but related concepts. 
 
In an effort to clarify some of these complexities, Raynor and Robinson (2009) go 
on to offer their own typology of perspectives on offender rehabilitation, 
examining the meanings and significance of correctional rehabilitation; 
rehabilitation and reform; reintegration and resettlement; and rehabilitation and 
the law.  
 
Correctional rehabilitation, they argue, is concerned with effecting positive 
change in individuals. As such it is the model most commonly associated with 
treatment programs or other forms of offence- or offender-focused intervention. 
At its heart is the notion that many offenders can change for the better, given the 
right support. The idea of correction implies that the offender can and should be 
‘normalised’ or ‘resocialised’ in line with commonly accepted (though rarely 
Submitted to: G. Bruinsma and Weisburd, D. (eds.)(forthcoming) The Springer Encyclopedia of Criminology 
and Criminal Justice. Springer.  
explicitly articulated) standards of behavior. Raynor and Robinson make the 
critical but often neglected point that correctional rehabilitation is a very broad 
church; one that allow for almost as wide a variety of theories and 
methodologies about how ‘correction’ is to be achieved as there are theories 
about crime causation itself. That said, correctional rehabilitation, as its name 
suggests, tends to be preoccupied with changing offenders themselves, and so is 
closely associated with theories and methods that explain crime and target 
intervention at the level of the individual.  
 
Raynor and Robinson’s (2009) discussion of rehabilitation and reform notes that 
some penal theorists and historians draw a distinction between twentieth 
century ‘rehabilitation’, which was concerned with individualistic 
(psychological) treatment programs to correct one’s personality (or attitudes 
and behaviors), and ‘reform’ which refers to an earlier preoccupation with 
offering opportunities for education and contemplation in support of the reform 
of one’s moral character. As a form of shorthand, we might say that religion is to 
reform as the ‘psy’ disciplines (psychiatry, psychology and social work) are to 
rehabilitation. 
 
The terms reintegration and resettlement (or in the USA ‘reentry’) may involve or 
be connected with correctional rehabilitation, but they also extend beyond it; in 
a sense, they imply its objective. If correctional rehabilitation is the journey, 
reintegration is the implied destination. Raynor and Robinson (2009) draw here 
on the work of Crow (2001) and others in suggesting that rehabilitation must 
lead to and involve restoring the ex-offender’s status as a citizen and 
renegotiating his or her access to its privileges and responsibilities. Whereas 
correctional rehabilitation dwells on the individual and the psychological, 
‘reintegration and resettlement’ signals the sociological aspects of rehabilitation; 
proponents of such an approach tend to have a sharper awareness of the social 
rather than the individual causes of crime, and of the social rather than the 
individual issues at stake in desistance from crime. Moreover, rather than being 
a mode of punishment (or a method applied during punishment), this 
perspective tends to stress the need for rehabilitation to act as an antidote which 
seeks to address, compensate for or seek to undo the adverse, usually 
unintended, collateral consequences of punishment itself. Rehabilitation in this 
vein is sometimes conceived a duty of the state that follows from its obligation to 
delimit punishment and to bring it to an end (Cullen and Gilbert, 1982). 
 
A natural (though again often neglected) corollary of the concern with 
reintegration and resettlement is a concern with rehabilitation and the law. 
Though we come to it last, the earliest use of the term rehabilitation (at least in 
legal or criminal justice contexts), according to Raynor and Robinson (2009) was 
in late 17th century France where it referred to the destruction or undoing of a 
criminal conviction; to the deletion or expunging of the criminal record. A 
century or so later, Cesare Beccaria (1764/1963), reflected a similar meaning of 
the term in arguing for the use of punishment as a way of ‘requalifying 
individuals as… juridical subjects’ (Foucault 1975/1977: 130). In this sense, 
punishment itself was meant to be rehabilitative in settling the putative debt that 
offending created. Rehabilitation was thus an end of punishment in both senses 
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of the word; it was its proper objective and its final conclusion. Rehabilitation 
was the restoration of citizenship, not in the de facto sociological sense discussed 
above, but in the de jure legal sense. 
 
Raynor and Robinson’s (2009) taxonomy helps us a great deal with unraveling 
‘the rehabilitation fankle’, but there are one or two further strands that we need 
to identify before moving on to examine which meanings and versions of 
punishment might be consistent with which meanings and versions of 
rehabilitation.   
 
Firstly, it is worth stressing that the meanings of rehabilitation are historically, 
culturally and jurisdictionally conditioned. As we have already seen, the broadly 
correctional form of rehabilitation has been expressed in very different ways in 
different times and places. Two decades ago, Edgardo Rotman (1990) in a 
brilliant and brief introductory chapter to his book ‘Beyond Punishment’, 
summarised the history of rehabilitation as being represented in four successive 
models.  The first two of these – the penitentiary model and the treatment model 
– correspond loosely to our discussion of reform and rehabilitation above. The 
penitentiary was seen as a place of confinement where the sinner is given the 
opportunity to reflect soberly on their behaviour, and on how to reform 
themselves (note ‘reform’ rather than ‘rehabilitate’), perhaps with divine help. 
But this idea was supplanted progressively by a more scientific or medical model 
in which rehabilitation was understood as a form of treatment which could 
correct some flaw in individuals, whether physical or psychological, thus 
remedying the problem of their behaviour.  
 
However, in the later half of the 20th century, this more medical or therapeutic 
version of rehabilitation was, according to Rotman, itself displaced to some 
extent, by a shift in emphasis towards a model based on social learning in which 
behaviours were understood as learned responses that could be unlearned. In 
this context rehabilitation was recast not as a sort of quasi-medical treatment for 
criminality but as the re-education of the poorly socialised (Garland 1985, 2001). 
Correctional rehabilitation’s interventions may have remained individualized, 
but they changed to reflect new theories of crime causation and thus new forms 
of ‘treatment’. This distinction between these two versions of correctional 
rehabilitation (treatment veruss social learning) is important, partly because, as 
we will see in the next section, it was one that was and is often ignored by 
rehabilitation’s critics.  
 
Criticisms of Rehabilitation 
 
As Bottoms (1980) notes, in a typically erudite and compelling chapter that deals 
with the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal, one cause of its demise was that it 
came to be seen as being theoretically faulty. It misconstrued the causes of crime 
as individual when they were coming to be understood as being principally 
social and structural, and it misconstrued the nature of crime, failing to recognise 
the ways in which crime is itself socially constructed. Moreover, rehabilitative 
practices had begun to be exposed as being systematically discriminatory, 
targeting coercive interventions on the most poor and disadvantaged people in 
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society. Rehabilitation was also coming to be seen as being inconsistent with 
justice itself because judgements about liberty had come to be unduly influenced 
by dubious and subjective professional judgements hidden from or impenetrable 
to the offender.  Through the development of the ‘psy’ disciplines, experts 
emerged with the supposed capacity to ‘diagnose’ what was wrong with the 
offender, and the offender was cast as a victim of his or her lack of insight. By 
implication, unless and until the offender was ‘corrected’ by the expert, s/he 
could not be treated as a subject. It was argued that rehabilitation faced an 
associated and fundamental moral problem rooted in its attempts to 
(psychologically) coerce people to change. Finally, at the time when Bottoms was 
writing, the empirical evidence seemed to suggest that, despite its scientific 
pretensions, rehabilitation did not seem to work.  
  
Powerful though it is, there are flaws in this critique. Crucially, emerging 
evidence about ‘what works?’ (McGuire, 1995) played a vital role in challenging 
the last point; there is now an evidence base for rehabilitation (McNeill, Raynor 
and  Trotter, 2010). But that evidence base, in and of itself, does not address the 
other four criticisms which I will label the problems of crime theory, of 
rehabilitation and injustice, of dubious expertise, and of coerced correction. 
Contemporary rehabilitation theories perhaps have more in common with a 
social learning or social psychological than a medicalised version of correctional 
rehabilitation (on the distinction, see Johnstone, 1996). But, even if rehabilitation 
is not now based on a strictly medical model, the full force of Bottoms’ (1980) 
criticisms is only partly deflected, and in this short chapter we can attend to each 
these criticisms only very briefly.   
 
While contemporary correctional rehabilitation’s underlying crime theories 
avoid the pathologising traps of individualistic positivism, they still have to 
engage somehow with the problem that crime is (at least in part) a social 
construct. We do not choose to pursue all interpersonal or social harms through 
criminalisation; the explanandum of crime theories is itself socially conditioned. 
That single insight has profound consequences. It affects and infuses the 
normative contexts of rehabilitative work (including raising difficult questions 
about who and what gets selected for penal ‘correction’ and who and what does 
not) and it creates a series of complex methodological quandaries about how to 
judge rehabilitation’s effetiveness (see McNeill, 2012).  
 
The problem of rehabilitation and injustice, or of rehabilitation’s place in or 
association with discriminatory justice practices, remains a challenging one, 
though it is hardly a criticism that applies only to rehabilitation and not to other 
criminal justice practices. That said, the problem for rehabilitation is not just 
systematic (if unintended) biases in terms of who gets selected for ‘correction’ of 
which sorts and who gets defined as ‘incorrigible’, but also a more technical 
problem of the extent to which rehabilitation’s resources (principally 
assessment tools and interventions approaches) are sufficiently sensitive to, for 
example, gender differences and cultural diversity (on which see, for example, 
Raynor, 2007; Robinson and Crow, 2009: Ch. 6). Significant though these 
problems are, they are problems about the proper administration of 
rehabilitation rather than the concept itself. 
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The problem of dubious expertise is only partly resolved by the development of a 
more robust evidence base for rehabilitation. While it is true that contemporary 
approaches, perhaps to varying degrees, tend to formally recognise the need to 
treat people as active subjects in their own rehabilitation (and not simply as the 
passive objects of expert intervention), there remains considerable force in 
critiques both of the professional power of the ‘psy’ disciplines (e.g. Rose, 1989) 
and, more specifically, of the increasing exercise of that power not in ‘treatment’ 
or ‘therapeutic’ decisions but in influencing decisions about justice itself, 
specifically in relation to sentencing or release-decision making. We will return 
to these problems below. 
 
Of course, the enduring problem of coerced correction is closely related to that of 
dubious expertise; coercion is a problem exacerbated in systems where 
increasing confidence in rehabilitation’s effectiveness has coincided with the 
development of a ‘toughening up’ of penal policy. One apparently minor aspect of 
this conjunction in England and Wales was the withdrawal of any requirement 
for consent to accredited program conditions within community sentences. 
These programs therefore involve rehabilitative treatment without consent; a 
development that seems to have come to pass without much critique from 
psychologists whose ethical standards it might seem to compromise. Though it 
might be said that all punishment is coercive, coercion seems to be a particular 
problem for correctional rehabilitation, since it seeks to change the individual 
rather than simply to restrain, confine or otherwise punish him or her. That 
suggests a particular form of intrusion into the inner world, even the identity of 
the subject, in respect of which coercion raises particular moral problems.              
 
Fortunately, Bottoms’ (1980) also provided some suggestions about how we 
might best respond to these problems. Reflecting the pessimism of the times, 
four of his five options imply or require a shift away from rehabilitation, at least 
as traditionally conceived.  However, he also argued that rehabilitation could be 
rescued through its own correction; that is, by attending more carefully to 
questions of consent, by committing adequate resources to make it more likely to 
be effective and by conducting our rehabilitative activities in ways which are 
more respectful of liberty. More specifically, we could ensure that the intrusions 
that rehabilitation imposes on the offender are never greater than is merited by 
their offending behaviour, placing rehabilitative requirements within the 
envelope of proportionality. 
   
There is no space here to properly review the renaissance of rehabilitation in the 
1980s and 1990s (see Raynor and Robinson, 2009, Robinson, 2008). However, 
leaving aside the better known story of the advancement of the evidence base, it 
is worth recalling that there was also, in the 1980s a brief flurry of writing about 
new normative or philosophical approaches to rehabilitation, including Rotman’s 
(1990) work (see also Cullen and Gilbert, 1982). The ‘new rehabilitationists’ (see 
Lewis, 2005), much as Bottoms’ suggested, proposed four principles to guide 
rights based rehabilitation: the assertion of the duty of the State to provide for 
rehabilitation; the establishment of proportional limits on the intrusions 
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opposed; the principle of maximising choice and voluntarism in the process; and 
a commitment to using prison as a measure of last resort.  
 
However, as Robinson (2008) has cogently argued, in policy and practice (in 
England and Wales at least) what emerged was not a more rights-based but a 
more profoundly utilitarian and correctional form of rehabilitation increasingly 
influenced by the preoccupation with public protection and risk reduction. 
Under this paradigm, probation officers were required to intervene with or treat 
the offender to reduce re-offending and to protect the public. What is critical 
about this shift in focus was that the ‘client’ or intended beneficiary of 
rehabilitative work is no longer the offender. Rather probation is trying to 
change offenders to protect the law-abiding (see McCulloch and McNeill, 2007, 
Robinson and McNeill, 2004). The offender becomes less and less an active 
participant and more and more an object to be assessed through technologies 
applied by professionals and compulsorily engaged in structured programmes 
and offender management processes as required elements of legal orders 
imposed, as we have already noted, irrespective of consent (McNeill, 2006). 
 
These developments in the relationship between correctional rehabilitation and 
those ‘offenders’ with whom it engages or, worse, on whom it operates – is a 
particularly important one. The shift from subject in to object of correctional 
rehabilitation implies a more coercive and utilitarian conception of 
rehabilitation; one which leaves the individual liberties and rights of the offender 
much more vulnerable, and one which opens up new prospects of abuses of the 
‘power to punish’, justified in the putative public interest. This form of 
rehabilitation may still be a process of intervention aimed at some public good, 
but returning to Raynor and Robinson’s (2009) initial definitions, the blunting 
both of its restorative intent and of its commitment to the offender’s interests 
(alongside others’ interests), as well as its willingness to impose (rather than 
renegotiate) ‘norms’ on objectified offenders represent major causes for concern.    
 
Which Punishment? 
 
Of course, we can’t make much sense of the relationships between rehabilitation 
and punishment just by analyzing rehabilitation – we need to examine notions of 
punishment too. Conceptually and practically, punishment is arguably even more 
‘fankled’ than rehabilitation. In part, as Hudson’s (2003) excellent introductory 
text both argues and demonstrates, this is because punishment is a 
quintessentially interdisciplinary subject that compels and requires 
criminological, legal, philosophical and sociological scrutiny, as well as raising 
fundamental political and practical questions. 
 
Tonry’s (2006) commanding and authoritative overview of the purposes and 
functions of sentencing provides a neat framework for analyzing punishment, 
distinguishing between sentencing’s purposes or normative functions (that is, its 
justifications), its primary functions (these being the proper distribution of 
punishment; the prevention of crime; the communication of threat, censure and 
of social norms), its ancillary functions (in contributing to the management of an 
efficient and effective justice system, and in securing legitimacy and public 
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confidence) and its latent functions (the ways in which it reflects self-interest, 
ideology and partisanship, and how and what it communicates informally). 
Though he does not explain his framework in these terms, we might suggest that, 
with notable exceptions, philosophers and jurists tend study and discuss the 
normative functions and primary purposes of sentencing, criminologists tend to 
examine its ancillary functions and sociologists tend to study its latent functions. 
We will return to criminological and sociological analyses briefly in the next 
section. For present purposes, it is perhaps most important to clarify firstly 
where rehabilitation fits amongst the normative justifications of punishment. 
 
As Tonry (2006: 16) argues: 
 
‘The overriding normative function of a sentencing system in a society 
committed to individual liberty, procedural fairness, and limited powers 
of government is to assure that individuals convicted of crimes receives 
the sentences that, in principle, they should.’ 
 
At first sight, this statement seems a little vacuous or circular – the point of doing 
justice is to do justice – but, at least in liberal democracies, it is vital to surface 
this too easily taken-for-granted assumption. If punishment involves the state in 
imposing harms on its citizens, then the process by which this is done must be 
carefully bounded and governed. But of course what is in and ‘out of bounds’ in 
sentencing depends to some extent on the normative principles that govern it. 
 
Tonry (2006) goes on to expose the enduring tensions between Kantian and 
utilitarian approaches to punishment. The former are essentially retrospective 
and concerned with the delivery of retribution or ‘just deserts’, in proportion to 
the severity of the offence and the blameworthiness of the offender. The latter 
are essentially prospective and concerned with the delivery of preventive effects; 
as we noted above, these are increasingly cast as the protection of the public and 
the reduction of offending and reoffending. These effects can be advanced 
through deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation. Tonry (2006: 18) notes that 
there ‘are good reasons why no relatively philosophically pure sentencing 
system [on either model] exists or has been seriously proposed at a policy level’ . 
He goes on to illustrate the practical problems of both Kantian and utilitarian 
approaches, and reviews a range of attempts to construct credible hybrid 
theories. Whatever the conceptual merits of these theories however, there is no 
doubt that in practice hybrid systems abound, though this is not to say that these 
systems are clearly articulated, coherent or defensible. One common feature of 
most hybrid systems is a commitment to some form of ‘limiting retributivism’ 
(Morris, 1974), in which culpability sets upper limits for the severity of any 
punishment to be imposed. The intrusions of punishment, in other words, must 
never be greater than are merited by the offender’s culpability (and perhaps by 
the gravity of the offence).  
 
As we have already seen, this limiting principle surfaced in the work of the new 
rehabilitationists of the 1980s and 1990s, requiring the intrusions of 
rehabilitation to be bounded by proportionality. Though this does represent a 
significant and suitable response to some of the criticisms of rehabilitation 
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discussed above, for advocates and practitioners of rehabilitation, the direct 
engagement with questions of justice and deserts that it entails has often been 
uncomfortable. Historically, at least in some jurisdictions (see McNeill, Bracken 
and Clarke, 2010), probation and criminal justice social workers have often  
considered themselves as providers and advocates of (usually rehabilitative) 
alternatives to punishment, rather than as providers and advocates of alternative 
punishments. Somehow the notion of punishing, as opposed to supporting, 
supervising, treating or helping – or even challenging and confronting – has 
seemed inimical to the ethos, values and traditions of probation and social work 
(cf. Garland, 1997).  
 
More recently, a different approach to the justification of punishment has 
perhaps offered the prospect of resolving some of these tensions, and of 
conceiving of punishment as rehabilitation (Duff, 2005). The penal philosopher 
Antony Duff – whose theory of punishment as communication has been highly 
influential -- has argued convincingly that we can and should distinguish 
between ‘constructive punishment’ and ‘merely punitive punishment’ (Duff, 
2001, 2003). Constructive punishment can and does involve the intentional 
infliction of pains, but only in so far as this is an inevitable (and intended) 
consequence of ‘bringing offenders to face up to the effects and implications of 
their crimes, to rehabilitate them and to secure… reparation and reconciliation’ 
(Duff, 2003: 181). Duff (2005) is not arguing for rehabilitation as moral 
education; to do so would infantilise offenders as well as calling into question 
their culpability for their crimes. Rather than restoring or correcting a deficit in 
the offender, moral rehabilitation aims to repair a breach in the relationships 
between the offender, the victim and the community that the offence has created. 
Repairing the breach is principally the offender’s responsibility; the starting 
point is a sincere apology which represents the recognition of the wrong done 
and the relational breach that it has created. But in most criminal cases an oral 
apology – however sincere – will not be enough: 
 
‘…something more is required—something that will make more forceful 
the apology that I owe…; something that will show that I am taking 
seriously the need to avoid such wrongs in future, and to reform myself 
and my conduct. Two elements of such moral rehabilitation might be, 
first, undertaking some burdensome task to express my apologetic 
repentance…; second, taking steps to address the causes or sources of my 
wrongdoing, and perhaps seeking help—whether informal or formal—in 
dealing with them’ (Duff, 2005: 19). 
 
Duff (2005) admits that he is speaking of criminal justice as it could be, or as it 
should be, rather than as it is. Nonetheless, he sees in some contemporary 
practices at least the opportunity for this kind of penal communication and for 
moral rehabilitation to take place: 
 
‘The burden that the offender is required to undertake, as his punishment, 
can be seen as constituting a formal, and forceful, apology to his victim 
and to the wider community. The apology has something of the quality of 
a public ritual rather than of a sincere expression of personal feelings, 
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though we may hope that it will become sincere; but it serves to make 
clear to the offender the wrong that he has done, and for which he owes 
and is required to offer this apology, and to make clear to the victim our 
shared recognition of that wrong. Furthermore, a probation order 
involves, as probation officers often put it, an attempt to… help the 
offender to confront the character and implications of his crime, and to 
find ways of avoiding repeating it, partly by programmes that seek to 
address offending behaviour and its causes: by undertaking such 
programmes the offender is also making apologetic reparation for his 
crime’ (Duff, 2005: 19). 
 
Duff’s work also helps us with a second problem, already referred to above, since 
he recognises that where social injustice is implicated in the genesis of offending, 
the infliction of punishment (even constructive punishment) by the state is 
rendered morally problematic. The state itself can be seen as complicit in the 
offending through having failed in its prior duties to the ‘offender’, for example, 
as is so often the case, where the offender was once a child in the care of the 
state. For this reason, Duff suggests that probation officers or social workers 
should play a pivotal role in mediating between the offender and the wider 
polity, holding each one to account on behalf of the other. Here, Raynor and 
Robinson’s (2009) discussion of the relationships between reintegration, 
resettlement and rehabilitation is relevant – the rehabilitation worker’s attempt 
to advocate for the ex-offender, to secure access (perhaps for the first time) to 
the full rights of citizenship acts as the counterbalance to direct work with the 
offender to invite and support their moral rehabilitation. This discomfiting, 
mediating space is one which many probation and social workers will recognise 
that they occupy and through which, with or without official or public support, 
they seek to promote social justice within criminal justice.  
 
There are other conceptual and empirical links that could be developed here, but 
to which we can only briefly refer. Duff’s work also resonates with the rise of 
reparation or paying back as an important justification of punishment (see 
McNeill, 2009; 2011; Robinson, McNeill and Maruna, forthcoming). Intriguingly, 
there is some empirical evidence that ‘making good’ is important for many of 
those desisting from crime (Maruna, 2001). In a sense, the relevance in this body 
of evidence of the concept of ‘generativity’ – referring to the human need to 
make some positive contribution, often to the next generation – hints at the links 
between paying back and paying forward, in the sense of making something 
good out of a damaged and damaging past  (see McNeill and Maruna, 2007). 
Bazemore’s (1998) work on ‘earned redemption’ examines more directly the 
tensions and synergies between reform and reparation, and the broader 
movements around ‘relational justice’ (Burnside and Baker, 1994/2004) and 
restorative justice (Johnstone and Van Ness, 2007) provide possible normative 
frameworks within which to further debate and develop these tensions and 
synergies.  
 
When Rehabilitation is Punishment 
 
Submitted to: G. Bruinsma and Weisburd, D. (eds.)(forthcoming) The Springer Encyclopedia of Criminology 
and Criminal Justice. Springer.  
Before trying to reach some conclusions about the relationships between 
rehabilitation and punishment, it is necessary to turn the chapter’s title around 
and explore ‘when rehabilitation is punishment’ or perhaps to ask more directly 
‘does rehabilitation hurt?’ 
 
Duff’s answer to the question, as we have already seen is a qualified ‘yes’. There 
is no sincere apology, and therefore no real moral rehabilitation, without at least 
the pain of confronting and admitting the wrong, and perhaps also the incidental 
pains of the work required to repair the breach in relationships. But beyond this 
principled position, there is also a growing body of empirical scholarship which 
shows that rehabilitation (of the therapeutic or correctional sort) also hurts in 
other ways, some of which may be less productive and less defensible than the 
pains Duff has in mind.  
 
There is, of course, an extensive body of scholarship, in the tradition of Gresham 
Sykes’ (1958) seminal work, on the pains of imprisonment. More recent 
iterations of this literature point not just to the peculiar pains of life in 
‘supermax’ conditions (King, 2005) but also to the pains and harms of mass 
incarceration itself (Haney, 2005), and to the pains and harms suffered by 
prisonsers’ partners and families, through ‘secondary prisonization’ (Comfort, 
2007).  
 
Perhaps more directly pertinent here are the pains of penal rehabilitation in its 
current risk-focused guise. Thus, for example, we find evidence, of burgeoning 
resentment amongst English prisoners towards what apparently seems to them 
to be the capricious and illegitimate exercise of ‘soft power’ by prison 
psychologists involved in key decisions about prisoner progression or release 
(Crewe, 2009; and more generally Maruna 2011). In similar vein, Lacombe’s 
(2008) ethnographic study of prison-based sex offender programs reveals the 
ways in which risk-based rehabilitation invites sex offenders to contort their 
perceptions and presentations of self in line with the requirements of the 
particular program or process to which they are subject. Cox’s (2012) compelling 
ethnographic analysis of the pains of youth imprisonment reveals a similar 
picture. 
 
These pains of risk-based rehabilitation extend beyond the prison too. The 
traditional absence of punitive intent in probation or criminal justice social work 
(noted above) does not necessarily entail an absence of ‘penal bite’; at least if 
studies of those subject to community supervision are to be taken seriously. For 
example, researchers at the RAND corporation in the USA found that there are 
intermediate sanctions which surveyed prisoners equate with prison in terms of 
punitiveness. For some individuals, intensive forms of probation ‘may actually be 
the more dreaded penalty’ (Petersilia and Deschenes 1994: 306; see also 
Petersilia 1990; Payne & Gainey 1998; May & Wood 2010). More recently, 
Durnescu (2011) has specifically explored the ‘pains of probation’ as 
experienced in Romania. Alongside deprivations of time and the other practical 
and financial costs of compliance, and limitations on their autonomy and privacy, 
probationers also reported the pain of the ‘forced return to the offence’ and the 
pain of a life lived ‘under a constant threat’. The threat in question in Durnescu’s 
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(2011) study was that of breach or revocation and with it further punishment, 
but the works referred to in the last paragraph also point to the threat of failing 
to persuade a probation officer, a psychologist, or some other professional that 
one’s ‘riskiness’ can be and is being properly addressed and managed.  
 
In one sense, there is little that is truly novel in this. For a prisoner of the Eastern 
State Penitentiary in the 19th century, placed in silent and solitary confinement in 
the hope that he would repent and make his peace with his Maker, the pains of 
penitentiary reform were doubtless profound. His project of ‘coercive soul 
transformation’ may have been designed and delivered somewhat differently 
than that directed at the late-modern risk-bearing prisoner or probationer – but 
both are subjected to disciplinary regimes (Foucault 1975/1977). But what may 
be peculiarly demanding for the late-modern penal subject is that, rather than 
being left to deal, before God, with his own sinfulness and redemption, s/he is 
compelled to display the malleability of his or her riskiness, to perform the 
reduction and the manageability of his or her riskiness. At least in some risk-
based systems, it is the credibility of this performance which will determine 
progression in and release from punishment. In those circumstances, 
rehabilitation is both disciplinary and punishing in a particularly potent way (see 
Crewe, 2012).   
 
Perhaps presaging these developments, Edgardo Rotman (1994), whose work 
we referred to above, draws an important distinction between anthropocentric 
and authoritarian rehabilitation: 
 
‘The authoritarian model of rehabilitation is really only a subtler version 
of the old repressive model, seeking compliance by means of intimidation 
and coercion. Rehabilitation in this sense is essentially a technical device 
to mould the offender and ensure conformity to a predesigned pattern of 
thought and behaviour... The anthropocentric or humanistic model of 
rehabilitation, on the other hand, grants primacy to the actual human 
being rather than metaphysical fixations or ideologies, which long served 
to justify the oppressive intervention of the state. Client centred and 
basically voluntary, such rehabilitation is conceived more as a right of the 
citizen than as a privilege of the state. A humanistic public policy 
regarding crime implies the idea of human perfectibility, which at the 
level of rehabilitation includes not only the offenders themselves, but also 
the society that bred them and the institutions and persons involved in 
their treatment’ (Rotman, 1994: 292). 
 
This distinction, and more specifically its implication that the person engaged in 
rehabilitation must be treated as a moral subject and not as a material object to 
be manipulated or adjusted in the interests of others, seems central to many of 
the claims that can be made for and against rehabilitation – and to the question 
of its relationships with punishment.   
 
 
Conclusion: When is Punishment Rehabilitation? 
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Returning finally to Raynor and Robinson’s (2009) discussion of rehabilitation, 
with which we began, we can now clearly discern four main forms or meanings 
of rehabilitation. In a recent paper (McNeill, 2012), I have called these 
psychological, judicial, social and moral rehabilitation. These are the four strands 
of rehabilitation that must be ‘de-fankled’ in order for us to analyze their inter-
relationships and mutual dependencies1.   
 
By psychological rehabilitation, I mean essentially what Raynor and Robinson 
(2009) refer to as correctional rehabilitation that seek to somehow change or 
restore the offender; to develop new skills or abilities, to address and resolve 
deficits or problems. A better, less loaded term, might be ‘personal 
rehabilitation’, since this need not imply that any specific disciplinary 
perspective or set of techniques is implied in this project of personal change. 
  
The second form of rehabilitation concerns the practical expression of Beccaria’s 
concern with the requalification of citizens; this is judicial rehabilitation – which 
raises questions of when, how and to what extent a criminal record and the 
formal stigma that it represents can ever be set aside, sealed or surpassed. 
Maruna (2011b) has recently argued cogently that efforts to sponsor 
rehabilitation and reform must address the collateral consequences of conviction 
– mostly notably its stigmatising and exclusionary effects -- or be doomed to fail. 
No amount of correctional or psychological or personal rehabilitation, and no 
amount of supporting offenders to change themselves, can be sufficient to the 
tasks and challenges of reintegration, resettlement and reentry, if legal and 
practical barriers are left in place. 
  
But these barriers are not just legal – they are moral and social too.  A solely 
correctional, psychological or personal conception of rehabilitation is inadequate 
to the moral and social offence that crime represents. In simple terms, doing 
something for or to or (better) with the offender, even something that aims at 
somehow changing them so as to reduce future victimisation, fails to engage with 
other key aspects of dispensing justice. Perhaps most importantly in moral 
terms, psychological rehabilitation offers no moral redress per se; it operates 
only on the individual ‘offender’, not on the conflict itself and not on the victim or 
the community (Zedner, 1994). In Duff’s (2005) terms, it leaves the relational 
breach unrepaired. Critically, reparation – and reparative work in particular -- 
seems capable of fulfilling this function in ways in which psychological 
rehabilitation in and of itself cannot, perhaps principally because reparation 
seems better able to convey (not least visibly) that redress is being actively 
provided. Though, as Duff (2005) reminds us, willingly undergoing psychological 
rehabilitation can convey the sincerity of the offender’s apology and of his or her 
desire to change, it is more typically a professionalised, private and secretive 
business, and not one that is explicitly bound into a process of moral 
rehabilitation.  
 
                                                        
1 This section of the paper draws on part of a conference paper co-authored with Shadd Maruna 
(McNeill and Maruna, 2010). I am grateful to Shadd for permission to use some of that material 
here.  
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Reparation perhaps speaks to the insistence that moral demands have to be 
satisfied, and moral communication secured, before moral rehabilitation can be 
recognised (Duff, 2001, 2003, 2005). In simple terms, an offender has to ‘pay 
back’ or to ‘make good’ before s/he can ‘trade up’ to a restored social position as 
a citizen of good character (McNeill and Maruna, 2010). As Bazemore (1998) has 
argued, redemption needs to be earned. This is not necessarily bad news for 
rehabilitation; as the Scottish Prison Commission (2008, para 33) noted, ‘one of 
the best ways for offenders to pay back is by turning their lives around’. But it 
does mean that rehabilitation theories and practices need to engage much more 
explicitly than hitherto with questions of justice and reparation.  
  
Ultimately, even where psychological or personal issues are tackled, legal 
requalification is confirmed and moral debts are settled, the question of ‘social 
rehabilitation’ remains. In European jurisprudence, the concept of ‘social 
rehabilitation’ entails both the restoration of the citizen’s formal social status 
and the availability of the personal and social means to do so (Van Zyl Smit and 
Snacken, 2009). But here, I mean instead something that is broader, deeper and 
more subjective; specifically, the informal social recognition and acceptance of 
the reformed ex-offender.  This, rather than the advancement of the ‘science’ of 
correctional rehabilitation, is perhaps the ultimate problem for rehabilitation 
today in practice.  
 
FIGURE ONE HERE 
 
Ultimately, as figure one above illustrates, I have tried in this chapter to 
disentangle rehabilitation and instead to show how its four forms might, in fact, 
constitute not a Scots ‘fankle’, but a kind of Celtic knot; one that weaves together 
these four strands and reveals their interdependencies. ‘Constructive 
punishment’, to use Duff’s term, can be rehabilitative; it should be rehabilitative; 
it must be rehabilitative. But it can only work to prevent crime if it also works to 
deliver justice, and that requires attention to all four strands.   
 
 
Suggested Further Reading 
 
There are two excellent textbooks that I would recommend on rehabilitation: 
 
• Raynor, P. and Robinson, G. (2005) Rehabilitation, Crime and Justice, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
• Robinson, G. and Crow, I. (2009) Offender Rehabilitation: Theory, Research 
and Practice. London: Sage.  
 
On the broader subjects of justice and punishment, I suggest: 
 
• Hudson, B. (2003) Understanding Justice. 2nd edition. Buckingham: Open 
Unversity Press. 
 
For useful collections of readings on these topics, I recommend: 
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• Duff, A. and Garland, D. (eds.)(1994), A reader on punishment,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
• Priestley, P. and Vanstone, M. (2010) Offenders or Citizens?  Readings in 
Rehabilitation. Cullompton: Willan.  
 
For more detailed treatments of the various issues raised in the chapter, I’d 
suggest starting with the works cited in the bibliography.   
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Figure 1: Four interdependent forms of rehabilitation 
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